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Spiritual Culture: Transcendence of
the Fundamental Problems of Life
Reimon Bachika
Only the universal is rational.
The particular and the concrete baffle understanding.
(Emiel Durkheim, 1964: 31)
The telos of culture
Life in modern societies is more and more differentiating and individualizing at the
same time. Social classes are disappearing, but other lines of social subdivision are com-
ing into existence through growing numbers of organizations and associations, growing
work specializations and professions, computer literacy, differentiating ways of life, lei-
sure activities and hobbies, differentiation of gender roles, various forms of youth cul-
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tures or subcultures.
The driving forces of the dynamic cultural expansion are quite varied: the still grow-
ing knowledge explosion, the new techniques of communication, the advent of informa-
tion society, growing intercultural communication, economic and political globalization. It
appears to be natural and unproblematic that all development is expansion and change,
but there seems to be a problem when change is unharmonious among collectivities that
can no longer act independently. It is a fact that the world as a whole grows towards
more and more interrelated collectivities. Within this situation it should be meaningful
to look for what these collectivities could have in common and what would affect more
balanced relationships. This is the goal of the present paper. Our core question is: do uni-
versal aspects of culture already exist or can they be developed? Could one discover a te-
los in the developments of culture?
In the search for cultural commonality, I propose to discuss universal spiritual cul-
ture. In this regard I will assume that universal spirituality must be sought in those as-
pects of culture that contain holistic meaning and in instances of culture where human
selves surmount states of mind and action that have only limited meaning for life as a
whole, intellectually, emotionally, and morally. In particular, I will argue that the impor-
tant aspects of spiritual concern transcend the material and limiting sociocultural condi-
tions of human life and its fundamental problems. Ultimately, I take the spiritual to be
an important dimension of human well-being. ‘Physical’ well-being cannot be the only
way of human happiness.
A crucial and problematic part of our subject matter is religion. Religious believers
usually see it as the paramount area of the spiritual, but nonbelievers do not engage in
the same way of thinking. Religion is a matter of latent controversy, not likely to be re-
solved soon. The categories of religion have evolved over long periods of time into differ-
ent species and subspecies that in practice, more often than not, do not recognize each
other. Partly due to this situation, many people are wary about religious matters, others
reject religion as a genuine form of culture. Acceptance and rejection of religion is part of
theories and identities. Because of its controversial nature, I do not wish to be concerned
with religion directly.
In outline, I shall start the discussion by reviewing some manifestations and signals
of transcendence as pointed out by Thomas Luckmann and Peter L. Berger, and continue
with a discussion of the physical and socio-cultural conditions of living and the funda-
mental problems of life: ignorance, suffering, and evil. The last part of the paper con-
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cerns the inherent mechanisms that make spiritual dimensions of life possible: symboli-
zation and valuation.
Different views of transcendence
As can be seen in particular writings by two sociologists of religion, Thomas Luck-
mann and Peter Berger, the meaning of the term transcendence is considerably different
when used anthropologically or theologically. This difference may also be expressed by
saying that the latter use is substantially religious and the former functionally religious.
The ‘substantial’ meaning is narrower than the ‘functional’ one. In other words, both
stand for a maximum and a minimum possibility of transcendence respectively.
Luckmann (1967) utilizes the term transcendence in a ‘functionally’ religious or an
anthropological sense, to indicate a quality of religion, that is, the “transcendence of bio-
logical nature,” which is a key proposition in his theory of religion. His general goal was
to criticize theoretical positivism in the sociological study of religion during the 1960s,
which centered on superficial problems of secularization, such as the decline of ecclesias-
tic institutions and church-going. The sociology of religion, according to Luckmann, has
theoretically more important tasks, for instance, theorizing the relation between the indi-
vidual, society, and religion.
Luckmann neatly summarizes his view as follows:
“Religion is rooted in a basic anthropological fact: the transcendence of biological nature by human
organisms. The individual human potential for transcendence is realized, originally, in social proc-
esses that rest on the reciprocity of face-to-face situations. These processes lead to the construction
of objective worldviews, the articulation of sacred universes and, under certain circumstances, to in-
stitutional specialization of religion. The social forms of religion are thus based on what is, in a cer-
tain sense, an individual religious phenomenon: the individuation of consciousness and conscience in
the matrix of human intersubjectivity (Luckmann 1967: 69).
Thus, Luckmann maintains that, by becoming conscious of one-self and by appropri-
ating a structure of meaning, the individual transcends the abilities of his or her biologi-
cal nature. The development of consciousness, as is clearly the case of the newborn, does
not take place without assistance of other humans. Because mental development does not
occur without external stimulation, it can be said that this form of transcendence is not
given in the ‘raw’ biological nature. Luckmann concludes that its development is a uni-
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versal, ‘religious’ phenomenon.
In turn, Berger (1970), as a sociologist, reflects on the possibility of theology produc-
ing a kind of theodicy in order to offset the far-going trends of the present-day age, which
are profoundly secular, utilitarian, and hedonistic and which dismiss the supernatural.
Resurgent forms of religion notwithstanding, Berger observes that religious believers are
becoming a “cognitive minority.” Being concerned with the fate of religion, he then dis-
cusses several “signals of transcendence” drawing on philosophical and sociological litera-
ture. By signals of transcendence he denotes “phenomena that are to be found within the
domain of our ‘natural’ reality but that appear to point beyond that reality” (Berger 1970:
70). He derives these signals from the following: social order, human play, hope, humor,
and the idea of damnation. Briefly summarized they are as follows. Firstly, Berger ar-
gues that order is a basic and necessary condition of social life, which may suggest the
existence of a higher form of order in the universe. Secondly, human play, as part of the
reality of life, suspends the rules of the ‘serious’ world. This, too, eventually points to the
existence of another reality. Thirdly, in his argument concerning hope, Berger points out
that human existence is always oriented towards the future, possibly a future beyond
death. Though not validated by empirical reason, people continue to hope. Fourthly, hu-
mor, or the comic, reflects the imprisonment of the human spirit in the world. It also re-
lativizes the ‘serious’ business of the world. Lastly, the idea of damnation presents itself
as a form of negative reasoning. In other words, a refusal to condemn monstrous evil is a
fatal impairment of humanitas. Either one denies that there is truth, or one looks for
validation beyond this world, transcending the human world (Berger 1970: 66−96).
Berger mentions that many philosophical considerations can be brought forward to
underscore his view, but, ultimately, he concedes that a transcendental dimension cannot
be proven. Its possibility rests on an act of faith. This he calls “a possible solution to the
vertigo of relativity” (Berger 1970: 92).
The views of transcendence discussed by Luckmann and Berger differ in the sense
that the former does not discuss an explicitly religious reality while the latter explicitly
relates his signs of transcendence to religious beliefs. Yet to me both seem to discuss
similar phenomena, that is, general human conditions that are requisites for having re-
ligion. Thus, in Luckmann’s view, qualifying the aspect of transcending individual bio-
logical nature as ‘religious’ indeed can be said to be religious in the sense that this tran-
scendence is a condition for the formation of religious attitudes. Yet at the same time it
is also a condition of being human. In other words, Luckmann’s transcendence concerns
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subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the most basic properties of human existence. Subjec-
tivity evidently is the common condition not only of religion but also of all other forms of
human culture. As for Berger’s view, his signals of transcendence are expressions of hu-
man life that manifestly exceeds animal existence. Sensibility to order, relativization of
overly rational attitudes, hope, humor and a sense of righteousness must be evaluated as
human sensibilities and expressions of subjectivity, animals are not capable of.
In sum, one can say that both the above authors’ notions of ‘transcendence’ merely
denote a generic human phenomenon, which evidently is not religious in the narrow
sense. A question that might be raised here is whether all forms of transcendence are
equivalent, and, in the same breath, whether all forms of spirituality are similar in na-
ture.
A term similar to transcendence is ‘enlightenment’ that, though not exclusively, is
much used in the context of religion. Transcendence is primarily a Western, religious
term, originally presupposing a radical break between nature and what is called the su-
pernatural. Eastern religious thought predominantly presupposes the oneness or imma-
nence of all reality. In this latter worldview, human life is merely a manifestation of Life
in the universe. Enlightenment in Buddhism concerns the possibility of overcoming the
contingencies of human life (ignorance) and of realizing the buddha nature (bussho) that
permeates all forms of life and is somehow contained even in inorganic matter.
Both terms transcendence and enlightenment appear to have been devaluated lately,
partially because of the rejection of religious attitudes and partially because of a new re-
ligious thought that does not rely on these terms. This seems to be the case of the New
Age Movement or, more broadly, “the new spirituality movements and culture.” (Shima-
zono 1996, 2002; Maekawa 2001). The aim of these movements roughly seems to be self-
realization and seeking a more authentic self. However, inasmuch as the terms transcen-
dence and enlightenment denote human phenomena, they need not be suspicious or fun-
damentally problematic. The same regards the term ‘the spiritual’ and the religious it-
self. In my view, all these terms are metaphors that express a specific, more or less dis-
tinct, characteristic of our subject matter: spiritual culture. To this we will return later.
The conditions of human life
Human life is conditioned by the physical and sociocultural, environmental factors
on which it is dependent to the extent that dependence and contingency are characteris-
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tics of human nature itself.
Obviously, all life is conditioned by its physical existence. Needless to say, individu-
als must fulfill physical needs in order to live and to act. The same is true for the proper
functioning of the human mind. It is conditioned in two ways, ‘internally’ by the physical
qualities of the human brain, and ‘externally’ by the existence of objects and other sub-
jects to which it relates.
Basically, the material world is a world of usefulness for fulfilling physical needs－
which is lately seen as an organic-inorganic system in its own right. The usefulness of
the physical world in our age has become enormously enhanced by means of science and
technology. Yet, for all its practical usefulness, the significance of the physical world is
not limited to fulfilling physical needs. Humans also have non-physical needs that are
served by observing the physical world as an object of thought and contemplation for in-
tellectual and emotional enjoyment.
Further, human life is conditioned by belonging to collectivities. As referred to ear-
lier, humans are basically social beings to the extent that they cannot become humans
without stimulation by other humans and internalizing culture. Initially, in primary so-
cialization, the internalization of culture proceeds more or less in an unconscious way. In
secondary socialization, one internalizes culture through conscious identification. Both
forms of socialization engender a sense of belonging. However, to the degree that collec-
tivities are static, belonging may be experienced as a limiting condition.
Mental interaction with the physical and sociocultural world is the most basic condi-
tion of mental growth. The human self is essentially a growth-process. To repeat, hu-
mans become humans through socialization and the internalization of culture via com-
munication with and through recognition by others. Self-identity is a social product. De-
pendence is as pervasive as it is profound. Dependence is further complicated through
the fundamental problems of human life: ignorance, suffering, and evil, three forms of
chaos humans are ill at ease with (Geertz 1973: 100−110).
Humans at birth are totally ‘ignorant’ to the extent of lacking self-consciousness. No
knowledge emerges from within an individual organism. Having only a certain amount of
potential, all knowledge has to be gained from external sources. In this respect, humans
are quite different from the lower forms of life. Plants almost automatically realize their
potential and animals develop theirs without much learning.
Human ignorance as a problem is well recognized by most religions. Human foolish-
ness is a theme in the wisdom literature in the Bible, but Buddhism has dug deeper in
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this terrain. Buddhism sees ignorance as lying at the core of the Law of cause and effect
in the human world. It is the first link in a series of twelve that determine human exis-
tence (juni engi) (Mizuno: 1973; Dalai Lama: 2000). In a different way, foolishness in Bud-
dhist teaching is seen a one of the three human ‘poisons’ together with greed and anger.
Buddhism concluded that there is ‘no-self,’ exposing fundamental human dependence and
the lack of self-sufficiency of individual human nature.
The second basic human problem is suffering, which comes at least in two varieties:
physical and mental suffering. Some instances of physical suffering are quite natural, es-
pecially sickness and death. It is again Buddhism that has chewed most on this difficult
to digest human condition. Suffering (issai kaiku), after dependency and the characteris-
tic of no-self, is the third peculiarity of the Law of all living.
Other instances of suffering are inflicted by fellow human beings and eventually by
one-self. These constitute the third category of fundamental human problems: evil. It is a
special kind of suffering on which I will comment below.
Lower and higher forms of experience
If the human self constitutes a process of growth and self-fulfillment, one can distin-
guish different forms of experience, lower and higher forms, depending on whether
growth and self-fulfillment are impeded or enhanced. Let us see some examples.
With respect to physical conditioning, experience seems to be of a low quality when
the means for fulfilling one’s physical needs are lacking, when usefulness is non-existent,
when physical harm occurs through bodily dysfunction, accidents and natural disasters.
In respect to social conditioning, particularly, at a time in history when self-realization is
highly evaluated, becoming aware of merely ‘existing’ within a social group cannot be
rated as very significant in terms of experience. Again, a form of lower experience seems
to derive from attempts to maximize self-satisfaction as in the case of addiction to alco-
hol, drugs, and sex. Addictions often lead to depression and suicide (Anthony Giddens 1992:
65−70). Maximizing collective self-realization tends to cause forms of lower experience to
other collectivities. Other forms of lower experience occur, e.g., in conflict situations and
instances of discrimination, resulting in harm to one’s sense of self-respect. Further, ex-
perience is of low quality when higher experiences turn ‘sour,’ when one experiences the
absence of enjoyment, e.g., when one is confronted with ugliness, when internal confusion
is too great to enjoy even the best of physical conditions.
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The fundamental problems of life evidently denote a low quality. Becoming aware of
ignorance can be very painful. The same is true for mental suffering in the face of adver-
sity and evil. For most people, evil denotes harm done by others, constituting an injus-
tice. A deeper problem is that “［T］he problem with evil is concerned with threats to our
ability to make sound moral judgments” (Geertz 1973: 106). Casting doubt on our ability to
judge what is good and what is not, and having to accept judgments of others in this
matter may hurt our sense of self-worth.
In contrast, bodily feelings of well-being mostly lead to higher forms of experience.
Other examples of higher forms of experience are the positive enjoyment of culture, of
uncalculated acts of kindness, endearing emotional relations, creative contributions to so-
cial and cultural life, and so forth. Thus, one’s family life and work may occasion higher
forms of experience, yielding satisfaction and stimulating mental growth.
However, here we seem to have stumbled on a fundamental theoretical problem.
Even though many experiences are clearly understood as having either a certain degree
of positive or negative significance, it is not certain when such is the case and under
what circumstances. Cause and effect is not easily discernable. That it is not clear what
exactly constitutes lower and higher forms of experience is due partly to the fact that the
boundary of these experiences is not clear. Ignorance in many cases cannot be helped;
there are necessary instances of suffering such as the ultimate deterioration of health
and dying; on the other hand, suffering may be evaluated positively from a religious
point of view; it may be inflicted on purpose. Further, it seems curious that it is easier to
locate lower forms of experiences than higher ones. Are lower experiences in reality more
frequent?
Indeed, uncertainty about the outcome of these fundamental facts of life is both an
existential and theoretical problem. In the following I will attempt to clarify two mecha-
nisms of transcendence that may shed some light on those problems: symbolization and
valuation. This clarification should be the more meaningful if indeed lower forms of expe-
rience are more in evidence than higher forms.
Mechanisms of transcendence
As mentioned above, humans at the beginning of life lack an innate behavioral ori-
entation but have potential to develop orientations by learning patterns of behavior. I as-
sume that symbolization and valuation are basic human faculties that underlie learning
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behavior. Starting from this premise I further argue that symbolizations and values are
core elements of culture, forming distinct mechanisms, responsible for the dynamism of
culture. In reality, these mechanisms are closely interrelated. They function in combina-
tion but are analytically distinct.
Symbolization seems to be a mechanism responsible for extensive development. It is
a source of meaning construction and a means of fixation of meaning. In contrast, valu-
ation as a mechanism denotes evaluation of meaning. Speaking analogically, meaning
construction can be said to be linear and evaluation of meaning circular, moving in and
out of the former. Symbolizations accumulate differently from values. Subjectively, valu-
ation is more subject to change. Similar to the above case concerning the awareness of
lower and higher experiences, value coordination is as yet not understood well. Valuation
therefore is the greater problem. Let us first consider symbolization.
Symbolization
All symbolizations are basically simple and similar. Symbolization works through
substitution. One thing so to speak is the ‘cultural’ doppelgänger of another, or, the
meaning of one thing is explained by some implications of another. Differences among
symbolizations seem to derive from a lesser or greater degree of analogy. In other words,
some symbolizations are mere substitutions, while others are analogies that have more
‘weight,’ more ‘depth.’ The latter I would like to call metaphors. It is these that generate
new meaning.
Language basically is a symbol system. One can imagine that somewhere at the be-
ginning of civilization and the initial development of speech objects were ‘substituted or
represented’ by means of ‘words,’ that is, sound-formations. In the later development of
speech, words were subsequently ‘substituted’ by means of written symbols, pictures, hi-
eroglyphs, ‘characters’ (as in Chinese and Japanese) and combinations of letters. Thus,
objects were ‘substituted or represented’ in two ways: phonetically and graphically. Not
only objects but many other things were sebsequently represented in the same way: ac-
tions, thoughts, feelings, the properties of things, relations, functions, the dimensions of
place and time, different modalities and dimensions of actions, and so forth.
Obviously, we are touching on complex problems of linguistics and semiotics about
which my knowledge is limited but, I hope, sufficient for present purposes. Partly I am
relying on Julian Jaynes’ view of the significance of metaphor for language. To quote:
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The most fascinating property of language is its capacity to make metaphors. But what an under-
statement! For metaphor is not a mere extra trick of language, as it is so often slighted in the old
schoolbooks on composition; it is the very constitutive ground of language. I am using metaphor in
its most general sense: the use of a term for one thing to describe another because of some kind of
similarity between them or between their relations to other things. There are thus always two terms
in a metaphor, the thing to be described, which I shall call metaphrand, and the thing or relation
used to elucidate it, which I shall call metaphier. A metaphor is always a known metaphier operat-
ing on a less known metaphrand. I have coined these hybrid terms simply to echo multiplication
where a multiplier operates on a multiplicand.
It is by metaphor that language grows . . . (Jaynes, 1993: 48−49, italics in the original).
Leaving aside the precise role of metaphor in the system of language, I totally ascribe to
Jaynes’ conceptualization of it, that is, symbolization in the narrower sense (Jaynes does
not distinguish between symbols in a narrow or broad sense). In the following I will give
some examples, some borrowed from Jaynes.
The formation of some words clearly reveals a symbolic origin in the broader sense.
Good examples are: person, role, structure, system, status. ‘Person’ originally denoted the
mask of a stage performer, ‘role’ a rolled up scroll, and so on. The new meaning of these
words, the new concept that results, is an extension of their referents. Though differing
in formation, some Chinese characters are symbolic in the same sense. They are simpli-
fied pictures of objects and till today show reference to the concrete, external reality that
they represent. No new meaning is affected in the latter case.
Some words, the very metaphors, are symbolic in a special way. They generate new
meaning. Interesting examples are the words father and mother, which are curiously
similar in seemingly all Indo-European languages. Recently I checked them in Sanskrit,
where they read pitri and matri. I was amazed to find that they are derived from words
that denote heaven and earth, implying that the father figure from ancient times was
symbolized with the ‘metaphier’ heaven, while the image of a mother was derived from
the ‘metaphier’ earth. This ‘vision’ was retained in Roman and Geek mythology. The Ro-
man Jupiter ’ is the god of the sky, one of the principal gods. Its relation to the Sanskrit
pitri is evident. The Greek gods of heaven and earth, Ouranos and Gaiya, are personified
as a father and a mother figure but these words have a different origin. Further, it is re-
vealing that some words in Germanic languages related to ‘earth’ clearly are similar to
the word mother (mutter and moeder in German and Dutch respectively). For example,
the Dutch ‘modder ’ and the English ‘mud’, (both meaning the same) are of the same ori-
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gin. Similarly, Murast, moeras, denoting a swamp in German and Dutch respectively are
of the same origin.
A very interesting example of an unmetaphorical sounding word is the verb ‘to be,’
that together with its irregular conjugation was formed analogically. ‘To be’ derives from
Sanskrit bhu, “to grow, or to make grow.” The English “am” and “is” have evolved from
the same root as the Sanskrit asmi, “to breath.” Jaynes mentions: “It is something of a
lovely surprise that the irregular conjugation of our most nondescript verb is thus a re-
cord of a time when man had no independent word for ‘existence’ and could only say that
something ‘grows’ or that it ‘breathes.’ (Jaynes, 1993: 51).
There are many pleasant or unpleasant surprises, depending on one’s mindset!
Christianity teaches that God is like a father figure, because Jesus taught to pray to God
as ‘Our Father who art in heaven.’ (He used the Aramaic abba, in a meaning and use
similar to the English ‘Daddy’ as the best word to speak to God). Jodo-Buddhism believes
in Amida-Buddha, ‘who’ is represented by a benign, dignified, mysteriously looking man-
like figure sitting in meditation position. ‘Amida’ made vows to the extent of saving all
people first before entering nirvana. Yet, in a different way, Amida-Buddha is thought to
be the Eternal Life or the Eternal Light contained in the universe. Taoism believes in
Tao, the unfathomable essence contained in the universe, constituted by Yin and Yang.
Taoists symbolized this invisible existence with the character for Way.
The ancient people who fashioned these representations did not claim to have seen
the Tao or God or the eternal Buddha, but they thought they had experienced something
surpassing sense perception and expressed those feelings analogically in various ways.
The manner of ‘approaching’ unseen realities or the supernatural, in its Western sense,
is basically similar to the conceptualization of the words for father and mother in San-
skrit. It is also basically similar in the case of action-symbols and ritual.
Action-related symbols are much less numerous than word-symbols. The Buddhist
wheel of the Law and the Christian cross are primary examples. The Buddhist wheel of
the Law represents a wheel of a war chariot that is made to charge the enemy. Blades
are attached to the axle at both sides of the chariot for more fighting efficiency. At the
time Buddhism became a religion, it probably was the most effective piece of weaponry.
The early Buddhists chose the wheel of a war chariot to represent the central theory of
their religion, the eternal Law of cause and effect that shows the fundamental interde-
pendency of all living things. Understanding the Law was thought to facilitate enlighten-
ment. Through the understanding of the Law and acting accordingly, people would be
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able to destroy all human passions (bonno) like a chariot destroying the enemy. As such,
the wheel of the Law is a powerful symbol. The same holds true for the Christian cross
that was a cruel instrument for torturing and killing criminals. It was transformed into a
symbol of redemption. Both the wheel of the war chariot and the cross acquired new
meaning. Symbols apparently are more powerful, the greater the difference between the
original meaning and the new meaning.
The same can be said for the ‘degree of transcendence’ of metaphorical symbols, that
is, the new meaning they introduce. Though it is difficult to judge to what extent, the
transferring of meaning is different in each case. However, the more important point is
that a transferring of meaning effectively occurs and that there is a gain in meaning. The
metaphier of metaphorical symbols suggest more that their metaphrands contain. This
constitutes transcendence. As in our examples, a ‘heavenly Father’ is not quite an earthly
father but the image let one imagine God to a certain extent. Amida-Buddha is the Eter-
nal Life of the universe, or its Eternal Light, which we can imagine when thinking of the
life and light that we know. There is no guarantee that these symbols are ‘true’ in any
literal sense. Except for the fact that evidently there is a gain in meaning as in the case
of the wheel of the Law and the Christian cross, this meaning cannot be palpably veri-
fied. These symbolizations suggest the possibility of redemption in one way or another.
Therefore, they may represent an advantage when confronting mental and physical suf-
fering.
Valuation
Valuation, too, is basically simple. It is evaluation of action, of choosing what is use-
ful, meaningful, gratifying. In other words, humans can judge and choose what is of use,
what is good, and reject what is useless or bad. By acting and experimenting they find
out what is most effective and what is most satisfying.
In attempting to theorize about values, I would like to maintain, first, that a value is
an aspect of an act, the central point of which is gratification for oneself, for others, or
both. Often, though not always, evaluation involves choosing between different ways of
action. If a value is an aspect of an act, a value can be seen as the reward that results
from acting that is internalized through acting itself. The successful act tends to be re-
peated because of its gratifying effect. As is often mentioned in theories about values, it
is for this reason that a value functions as motivation for action. Yet, contrary to what is
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often assumed, the fact that a value is an inherent aspect of the action implies that act-
ing not necessarily involves choosing between different courses of action. In many cases,
action seemes to propel itself, even to the extent of overcoming external constraint. In
case choice is effected, it tends to be a choice between various rewards.
A second important point is that, prior to the internalization through autonomous
action, values are learned from significant others. Successful internalization of values
therefore depends on primary socialization. A ‘good start’ is supposed to be vital for hav-
ing a more or less well balanced set of personal values－total balance is impossible since
total socialization is impossible. Individuals growing toward adulthood of necessity must
experiment with their set of values. Since action in daily life is varied, one’s collection of
values will be varied respectively. It is for this reason that ambivalence is characteristic
of human action. Choice between different rewards will never be a settled matter.
Complexity of valuation and symbolization
The two mechanisms of valuation and symbolization, taken separately, are as plain
as they are fundamental. The differences in their functioning also appears to be clear-
cut. To repeat, symbolization involves meaning construction and its fixation. Valuation is
evaluation of meaning. In reality however these mechanisms do not function separately
but together. In daily life we are not conscious of the differences between symbolizations
and values, between rational and symbolic action. In most cultural studies symbols and
values are not distinguished, not even in studies of religions where symbols and values
(commandments) are notably different elements. The main reason for not isolating these
core elements, no doubt, is the fact that in reality they are closely related phenomena
and show almost infinite variation in individuals, in collectivities, and within various
patterns of social action. Tackling this complexity cannot be our present concern.
Finally, I will attempt a few considerations about the possibility of universalization
of symbolizations and values and their role in creating spiritual culture.
Spiritual culture and transcendence
All knowledge functions as a means of transcendence of ‘raw’ biological nature in the
sense discussed by Luckmann. None is given within biological human existence. Nothing
emanates internally from the brain itself. A normally functioning human brain is a pre-
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requisite substratum for the development of consciousness and subjectivity, and, as Jay-
nes elegantly argued, language has been of great consequence in the development of con-
sciousness (Jaynes, 1993: 129−137).
Similarly, Berger discussed manifestations of human transcendence that involve
symbolizations and symbolic action: the creation of social order, human play, expressions
of humor and hope in adverse situations, and the condemnation of evil. Whether these
things point to a higher order of reality is not important in the present context. As sug-
gested earlier, the more important point is whether transcendence is affected or not.
The point I am advancing is that transcendence is created by metaphors, through
the formation of concepts and new meanings. Due to being embedded in the concrete,
symbols are essentially particularistic, even though they have a transcendent quality,
shown in the birth of new meaning, including religious meaning. However, because of
their embedment in the concrete and the particular, symbols are not apt to be universal-
ized. For example, there are various views of enlightenment and many religious symbols
like the Buddhist wheel of the Law and the Christian cross, each of which is important
for the religion concerned－each religion can remain unique by retaining its own symboli-
zations. Another pertinent example is language as a symbol system. Language must not
‘globalize.’ If the whole world would come to speak only one language, culture will ulti-
mately deteriorate.
Also values originate from concrete behavior. Values are aspects of acts. Yet as ele-
ments of culture, values are ideas about behavior and being. As such, values are share-
able and better suitable to become universal elements of culture than symbolizations. So-
cial values have the greater transcendent meaning the more they are shareable. The
same does not hold for shared symbolizations, since they consolidate meaning. In the in-
troduction I have stated hypothetically that the universally spiritual culture must be
sought in those areas of culture that have transcendent meaning for life as a whole, in-
tellectually, emotionally, and morally. Admittedly, this hypothesis sounds tautological.
However, it will be easily agreed upon that lower forms of experience and situations in-
volving the fundamental human problems of ignorance, suffering, and evil are not evalu-
ated as meaningful. They are experienced as painful in various ways. Overcoming these
problems and again being able to enjoy life leads to higher forms of experience. Although
we cannot be certain about what in a state of mind actualy is of a lower or higher degree,
we can find out how it is affected. The pain of ignorance can partly be overcome through
humility, that of suffering through patience, compassion, and sharing of grief. Evil can be
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overcome through forgiveness. Thus, humility, patience, compassion, and forgiveness are
values that are significant as unique means of ‘transcending’ the respective problems.
However, the problem of ignorance is quite different from those of suffering and evil.
Ignorance can more easily be overcome by means of symbolizations and knowledge than
suffering and evil. All instances of metaphorical transcendence, originating in thinking,
are little steps, little glimpses of spirituality. Transcendence in this case is affected
through thinking that stops as it were when something new is found or created. All sym-
bolizations create and fix meaning, although thinking itself does not become fixed. Val-
ues, on the other hand, are aspects of action. They are a matter of attitude, which is
never fixed. Attitudes may change from one moment to the other. The transcendence of
values is affected through will and the degree of transcendence will depend on the degree
of will exercised. Suffering and evil can only be overcome minimally through knowledge
but more through action that incorporates those values. While symbolizations are par-
ticular, limited in meaning or applicability, social values seem to have more applicability,
paradoxically because the range of action is more limited than the range of thinking.
Every day life is similar for all humans. Because all share the fundamental problems of
life, all could share the same values to overcome them.
Universal spiritual culture then must be sought in those aspects of life that are com-
mon to all people. Overcoming of the fundamental problems of suffering and evil appears
merit the greatest consideration in this respect because the ways of overcoming these
seem few in number and common to all people. Transcendence in this area is more vital
than transcendence in overcoming ignorance. Concern for reducing suffering and evil is
possibly the place to look for the telos of culture.
Human life has an open dimension that developes through symbolization and valu-
ation. Both processes produce spiritual culture. Both have a transcendent quality, but
only valuation can produce universal spiritual culture. In other words, the greatest possi-
bility for universalization appears to be given in the area of morality. Its primary condi-
tion is the inclusion of the Other. Durkheim’s phrase “Only the universal is rational,”
takes on a paradoxical meaning. Coping with suffering and evil is usually not perceived
as rational action.
Note
An early version of this paper was presented at the 24th International Course on “The Future of
Religion: The New Century－Inclusion of the Other?” at the Inter-University Center (IUC) of Dub-
rovnik, Croatia, April 24−28, 2000.
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